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BELONGING TO AMERICA. By Kenneth Karst. 1 New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 1989. Pp. xi, 329.
Cloth, $29.95.
Lauren Robe/2

When I was thirteen, my family moved to Montgomery, Alabama. Nothing had prepared us for the South of 1965, and nothing
in my childhood to that point had prepared me for the rigid hierarchies of life in a resentfully mtegrated school. On my first day at
school, I violated a crucial part of the racial code I had not yet
learned by eating lunch at a table with an empty seat. After lunch,
a boy I had never met pulled me aside to tell me that "we" did not
eat with "them." I was bewildered: who were "we"? I didn't know
this boy. I was embarrassed: how could I have made a mistake on
my first day?
The point of the boy's warning, of course, was to tell me that
black students didn't belong, and that I wouldn't belong either if I
didn't learn the rules. I soon found there were many situations like
this one, and that my white skin did not always make me presumptively an insider. My school still started the day's classes with the
Lord's Prayer, for instance, but this prayer kept going after my
Catholic training taught me to stop. Should I just go along with my
classmates' religious practice, or hope that no one noticed if I
stopped "early"? I was part of the "we" as compared to the few
black students in my school, but not as compared to my mostly
Protestant classmates.
Most Americans have stories like these, and I share mine only
because they illustrate a central point in Professor Kenneth Karst's
book, Belonging to America. For children, group membership is an
integral part of self-definition. The boy who issued my first-day
warning was incredulous that I didn't know the rules that were second nature to him; my embarrassment came from the fear of exclusion. Our group memberships define our places in society; they tell
us where we belong. Professor Karst argues that such experiences
are part of an acculturation that results, for most of us, in a way of
thinking about groups and their members that is so deeply a part of
our understandings of who we are that we cannot really comprehend how it affects our ordinary decisionmaking. When the decisionmakers are judges, or legislators, these beliefs often
subconsciously affect decisions about burdens of proof in constituI.
2.
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tiona} cases or the allocation of societal resources that slight the
interests of members of racial and religious minorities and women
in being treated as equal citizens.
In asking who "belongs to America," Karst limns the psychological borders of our country to describe citizenship from the point
of view of the outsiders, those citizens historically excluded from
the country's public life because they belong to disfavored racial,
ethnic, or religious groups. Karst's project has several parts. The
first, directed at everyone who thinks seriously about such things as
race and gender, is an attempt to describe and explain the meaning
and power of acculturation in America. The second, directed more
specifically at lawyers and judges, is an argument about what the
effects of our history and our acculturation should mean for both
the process of reaching decisions, and the decisions that ought to be
reached in cases under the fourteenth amendment. The book is
both an exhortation to our best instincts as a nation and a reminder
of our worst. It serves as an antidote to the parsimoniousness of our
public life in the post-Reagan years, and an invitation to share in a
generosity of spirit that Karst doggedly sees slumbering in America.
Absent a common religion, devotion to a monarchy, or anethnically homogeneous population, what glue holds this country together? Professor Karst argues that our national bond is adherence
to a common "civic culture," a uniquely American blend of political beliefs stressing "individualism, egalitarianism, democracy, nationalism, and tolerance of diversity." At the core of this national
ideology is equality: a rejection of "caste, of rigid social hierarchy
that traps people in a system that holds them down."
Americans have always lived with substantial contradictions
between egalitarian ideals on the one hand and conduct that systematically denies the equality of members of certain groups on the
other. We have done so, Karst argues, by narrowly defining the
groups to whom our ideals apply. Historically, few groups have
"belonged to America" in the sense of viewing themselves as "fully
participating member[s] in the national community." We started
out, in fact, with only one group with full insider status: white,
male, Anglo-Saxon Protestants-and they argued among themselves about whose brand of Protestantism should prevail. Race,
ethnicity, language, and religion have all been used to relegate entire groups to subordinate status, which in tum means excluding
them from political and economic participation in American life.
The central problem of American constitutional law, given our
history, is the problem of subordination of groups. As a constitutional theorist, Karst attempts to breathe new life into two con-
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cepts, equality and citizenship, often left for dead in modem
constitutional theory. Central to Karst's argument is the principle
of "equal citizenship": "Each individual is presumptively entitled
to be treated by the organized society as a respected, responsible,
and participating member. Stated negatively, the principle forbids
the organized society to treat an individual as a member of an inferior or dependent caste or as a nonparticipant."
Karst uses the facts of five familiar cases, such as Jefferson v.
Hackney,J which reached the Supreme Court during the 1970s and
80s, to underscore the tenacity and power of our acculturated understandings of the meaning of race and gender and the need for a
principle such as the one he suggests. In each, a member of a disfavored group has been burdened by government action in a way that
seems directly attributable either to stereotypical thinking about
these groups by the relevant government decisionmakers, or by a
desire to show these people their "place." Nevertheless, their
claims are rejected by the Supreme Court. How did the Justices
manage to ignore or find inconsequential the effects of race, religion,
or gender on what happened to these individuals? And how might
these effects be profitably explored?
Karst answers the first question by writing a psychological history of the relations between insiders and outsiders in America.
Stigmatizing, the fear of the unknown, and the projection of a negative identity onto the outgroup, are common to the experience of
each group Karst discusses. Much of this account, such as the
chapters on Jim Crow or gender relations, is (or ought to be) familiar terrain for those of us who teach constitutionallaw.4
Less often tackled by legal scholars is the story of the legal
barriers to belonging faced by ethnic immigrants. Karst's chapter
on "nativism"-the legal and social exclusion of the foreign bornis particularly interesting for the light it sheds on such current issues as movements to legislate English as the national language.
Similar attempts succeeded during the great waves of immigration
during the 1800s, when America was at its most xenophobic: Iowa,
in fact, forbade the use of foreign languages in public and private
schools, in church services, in conversations in public places, and
even over the telephone. Karst makes a powerful case for the parallels between that sort of "intercultural domination" and the system
of Jim Crow, noting that housing and employment discrimination
3.
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4. I think these chapters, in fact, would be enormously useful in the classroom for
many students unfamiliar with the history of group subordination in this country. I was
astonished recently when one student expressed in class the view that slavery was a "social
system," apparently enforced through the good manners of the slaves.
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against ethnic and religious minorities was common during the latter part of the last century and the first part of this one.
Ethnic immigrants fought to belong through the political process, bloc voting, and political machines that assured their followers
of a piece of the economic pie. As many writers have noted, American politics has been much more resistant to the claims of black
citizens, who turned instead to the judiciary.
Woven into Karst's history are various Supreme Court decisions that involve race, gender and ethnicity. The Court's performance, overall, has not been impressive. While Karst begins with the
stunning case of Brown v. Board of Education, and finds good words
for the Warren court's state action cases, the more frequent examples are of the Court's failures, from Dred Scott through Washington v. Davis. Would Karst's equal citizenship principle help judges
take better account of the effects of racist and sexist acculturation?
Well, it would if judges could be convinced to follow Karst's
methodology. Karst joins a chorus of voicess encouraging judges to
think about the meaning an outsider would place on a government
actor's behavior. Karst is particularly effective in demonstrating
how changing perspective can open new avenues for thinking about
familiar cases. For instance, he encourages us to think about what
meaning Ruth Jefferson, a black woman on welfare and the named
plaintiff in Jefferson v. Hackney, would attribute to the Texas legislature's decision to economize by cutting her benefits to half of the
state's own assessment of what she needed to survive, while leaving
untouched the benefits of the elderly poor-most of whom were
white.
Karst also encourages judges to think about the historical and
institutional contexts of the cases they decide. In writing about the
illegitimacy cases, for example, Karst notes that in Louisiana,
where the first of the illegitimacy cases considered by the Court began, 6 "the legal disabilities associated with illegitimacy grew out of
that society's history of race relations." The legal status of illegitimacy not only allowed men's wealth and status to attach to women
and their children only when men chose to recognize the union or
the children, but also allowed white men to perpetuate the stigma
associated with race without having to be tainted by the existence of
their own black children. By placing legitimacy laws in their histor5. See, e.g., Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987); Lawrence, The I d. The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 30 STAN.
L. REV. 317 (1987); Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987).
6. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
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ical context, Karst illuminates their connection to the creation of a
system of caste.
Having given judges the tools to work with, Karst renews the
argument for the centrality of the federal judiciary, and particularly
the Supreme Court, in remedying the hurt of exclusion. Judicial
enforcement of the equal citizenship principle vindicates the central
tenets of the American civic culture, invites outsiders into the national community, and promotes the national good by assuring that
no group is a permanent loser in the political process.
As we begin the 1990s, this prescription seems hauntingly sad.
A court that could tell Native Americans that their religious practices (and everyone else's, for that matter) were the proper subject
of political brokering7 is an unlikely candidate for spiritual leader in
the quest for constitutional equality. But as Karst himself points
out, the strength of the judicial commitment to equality has never
been the measure of its pull on American consciousness--else how
could Brown v. Board ever have come about? Perhaps, then, we
should view Belonging to America as an eloquent reminder of the
importance of thinking seriously about equality, even if our judges
will not.
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The author is-we are told by the dust jacket- an "openly gay
professor" who has turned his attention
to the lives of gay people in America and to the ethical issues raised by society's
perception and treatment of gays.

This "timely book," it is said,
will prompt Americans to consider whether they have consistently applied their
basic values to lesbians and gays.
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